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profitability and stability is performed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure 
rate of time preference, the social welfare aggregator and the extent of climate damages. We 
focus on the profitability, stability, and “potential stability” of a number of coalitions which 
are “potentially effective” in reducing emissions. We find that only the grand coalition under 
a specific sets of assumptions finds it optimal to stabilise GHG concentration below 
550 ppm  CO2-eq. However, the grand coalition is found not to be stable, not even 
“potentially stable” even through an adequate set of transfers. However, there exist 
potentially stable coalitions, but of smaller size, which are also potentially environmentally 
effective. Depending on the assumptions made, they could achieve up to 600 ppm CO2-eq. 
More ambitious targets lead to the collapse of the coalition.  
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This paper analyses the incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions. 
Using the integrated assessment model WITCH, the analysis of coalitions’ profitability and stability is 
performed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference, the social welfare 
aggregator and the extent of climate damages. We focus on the profitability, stability, and “potential 
stability” of a number of coalitions which are “potentially effective” in reducing emissions. We find that 
only the grand coalition under a specific sets of assumptions finds it optimal to stabilise GHG 
concentration below 550 ppm CO2-eq. However, the grand coalition is found not to be stable, not even 
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assumptions made, they could achieve up to 600 ppm CO2-eq. More ambitious targets lead to the collapse 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The global public good nature of the climate change and its causes requires cooperation 
among countries and broad-based participation of at least major economies is required for any 
coalition to be environmentally effective. However, stable coalitions are generally small and 
might well not address satisfactorily the environmental problem, especially when they deal 
with a global externality as in the case of climate change (Barrett 1994, Carraro and 
Siniscalco 1993, Asheim et al. 2006, Bréchet et al. 2011). When the costs and benefits of 
international cooperation are large, as in the case of GHG emissions reduction, a stable 
agreement is hard to achieve, reflecting the difficulty to provide sufficient participation 
incentives to widely heterogeneous countries. Only when the benefits from cooperation are 
small, stable coalition can succeed to sustain a large number of signatories (Barret 1994). But 
in this case, they are not effective in reducing emissions considerably. 
A successful international climate policy framework will have to meet two conditions, build a 
coalition of countries that is potentially effective and give each member country sufficient 
incentives to join and remain in this coalition. Such coalition should be capable of delivering 
ambitious emission reduction even if some countries do not take mitigation action. In 
addition, it should meet the target without exceedingly high mitigation costs and deliver a net 
benefit to member countries as a whole. The novel contribution of this paper is mostly 
methodological, but it also adds a better qualification of well-known results that are policy 
relevant. The use of large scale macroeconomic models calibrated on historical data allow 
generalising results that have been obtained under more specific, and at times simplifying, 
assumptions and therefore it represents a complement to the broad literature on coalition 
theory. To our knowledge only a few studies have used a similar approach to assess climate 
coalitions. Bosello et la (2003) study  the effects of different equity rules on the incentives to 
cooperate using the dynamic integrated growth and climate model FEEM-RICE. Carraro et al 
(2006) use a stylized integrated assessment simulation model to show how appropriate 
transfers may induce almost all countries into signing a self-enforcing climate treaty. 
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Bréchet et al. (2011) compare different stability concepts using a modified version of 
Nordhaus and Yang (1996) model . Nagashima et al. (2009) use the STACO model to 
compare different transfer schemes and their impact on participation incentives, global 
welfare and abatement efforts. However, the STACO model does not explicitly model the 
nexus between economy, energy, and climate, but rather relies on reduced-form cost and 
benefit functions. The ClimNeg World Simulation model used by Bréchet et al. (2011) and 
Carraro et al. (2006), as well as the FEEM-RICE model, are a step ahead as they encompass 
economics, climatic, and impact dimensions. However, they do not fully model the energy-
emission linkage and they neglect international interactions through the diffusion of clean 
technologies developed for abatement purpose. 
The modelling framework  used in this paper represents a step-up over the models just 
mentioned. The WITCH model, used in the present paper, has two major strengths in this 
specific context. It belongs to the class of so-called integrated assessment models (IAMs), and 
therefore it incorporates explicitly the gains from emission reductions in terms of avoided 
climate change through regional damage functions that feed climate change back into the 
economy. It has a game-theoretic structure. The 12 model regions and/or coalitions of regions 
behave strategically with respect to all major economic decision variables, including emission 
abatement levels, by playing a non-cooperative Nash game. Therefore, when deciding 
whether or not to cooperate on GHG emission control, countries take into account how their 
decisions affect all other countries, and whether these countries will cooperate or remain 
outside the coalition. Mitigation options are fully modelled as investment choices in 
alternative energy technologies, abatement in non-CO2 gases, and changes in deforestation 
patterns. Moreover, technological change in energy efficiency and clean technologies is 
endogenous and reacts to price and policy signals.  Technological innovation and diffusion 
processes are also subject to international spillovers; this means that the model can represent 
multiple externalities, which can be partly internalized when coalitions are formed. 
Bosetti et al. (2009) evaluated the potential environmental effectiveness of all 4069 coalitions 
that would result from combination of the 12 regions. In particular, all coalition that could in 
principle deliver the stabilisation targets commonly discussed in the policy arena were 
identified. In the present paper we take stock of that analysis and, within the set of all possible 
climate coalitions, we focus on those that have the potential to meet an ambitious enough   4
global mitigation target. These are coalitions whose global emission path would be consistent 
with long-run stabilisation of global GHG concentration at 550 ppm CO2-eq, despite the BAU 
emission pathway of non-participating regions. For this subset of coalitions, we evaluate 
whether the welfare of each participating country is larger than the welfare it would obtain 
from withdrawing from the coalition and free riding on other participants’ abatement efforts 
(internal stability). We also checked whether there are international financial transfers that can 
compensate for the free riding incentives (potential internal stability). Given the uncertainties 
involved in predicting and valuing the future damages and risks from climate change, the 
analysis is performed under four alternative combinations of damage and discount rate 
assumptions. A low-damage case is based on the damage assessment in Nordhaus and Boyer 
(2000), while a high-damage case incorporates the more recent, upward revisions made for 
instance by Hanemann (2008) or Stern (2007). A low-discounting case assumes a (pure) 
utility discount rate of 0.1%, in line with Stern (2007), while a high-discounting case takes the 
3% value used in Nordhaus (2007). Finally we assess the effect of different weighting in the 
aggregation of regions’ welfare and the effect this has on main findings. 
Following a presentation of WITCH’s game-theoretic framework in Section  2, Section  3 
assesses the basic individual incentives for countries to participate in coalitions. Section 4 
brings together the incentive effects associated with damages and abatement costs to analyse 
coalition formation and stability. Conclusions follow. 
2.  THE GAME THEORETIC STRUCTURE OF WITCH 
The numerical analysis uses the WITCH model
1, an energy-economy model that incorporates 
a detailed representation of the energy sector into an inter-temporal growth model of the 
global economy. The emphases on the energy sector and GHG mitigation options allows 
technology-related issues to be studied within a general equilibrium framework characterised 
by environmental (expected future climate change damages), economic (exhaustible natural 
resources), and technology (knowledge and experience spillovers) externalities (Bosetti et al. 
2006, 2008). Each region's economy is modelled in line with a Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans 
model where the representative agent maximizes intertemporal welfare, by optimally 
                                                      
1 See www.witchmodel.org for model description and related papers.     
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choosing the investments path, given a production function for the final good, a budget 
constrain and kinetic equations for capital accumulation. WITCH can simulate all degrees of 
cooperation among the 12 macro-regions in which world countries are aggregated. The model 
can run in a cooperative mode where global social welfare is maximised. In this case, 
cooperation internalises the environmental externality. The model can also provides a 
decentralised, or non-cooperative solution, by optimising the welfare of each individual 
region, taking as given each other region’s choice. In between these two extremes it is 
possible to model all possible combinations of smaller coalitions that coexist with non-
cooperating regions. 
The  scenarios obtained from the WITCH model are thus the outcome of a game in which 
world regions interact in a setting of strategic interdependence.  
Since players/regions are not symmetric in WITCH, both in their climate damages and 
abatement costs, coalitions are characterized not only by their size but also by their 
composition. The set of coalitions Γ  is therefore composed of 4,095 possible combinations 
among the 12 regions, including the grand coalition γGC, which comprises all players. When 
formed, coalitions become players of the game. Regions that do not join the coalition are said 
to behave as singletons or as free-riders.  
The action of each player consists in choosing the path of investments in the economic 
variables governing the economy, the energy sector, and technological progress. Investments 
in the energy sector and in research and development (R&D) determine regional GHG 
emissions. The accumulation of GHG emissions in the atmosphere and the effects on global 
mean temperature are governed by a reduced form climate module. A climate change damage 
function provides the climate feedback on the economic system, in the form of a GDP loss. In 
this setting, cost-benefit analysis can be performed. Regions choose their investments trading 
off the costs and the benefits, in terms of reduced damage, of their actions.   
The outcome of the game for each region or group of regions is a consumption path over the 
whole simulation horizon. Regions i=1,…,12 express their preferences over the outcomes of 
the game using a monotonous, twice continuously differentiable utility function on discounted 
per capita consumption. If t denotes time,  t i c ,  per capita consumption,   i W  the payoff of player 
i   defined as a function of utility of per-capita consumption, u, then     6





























c u γ , with γ being a coalition 
in the set of all coalitions,  Γ ∈ γ . In WITCH the utility function is the same for all players and 
has logarithmic shape. The rate of pure time preference  t δ  declines over the century. 
Utility functions represent a complete preference ordering over a given set of goods or over an 
aggregate consumption level. They can be used to assess if a given consumption level  t i c ,  is 
preferred or not with respect to its alternative  t i c ,
~ . Monotonicity implies that 
( ) ( ) t i t i t i t i c u c u c c , , , ,
~ ~ ≥ ⇔ ≥  but does not allow to evaluate by how much  t i c ,  is preferred to  t i c ,
~ : 
utility is not a cardinal property. Therefore, utility cannot be compared directly among 
players. This is an important aspect when studying the possibility of sustaining larger 
coalitions by means of internal transfers.  
When coalitions are formed, they act as players and choose actions to maximize joint welfare. 
It is thus necessary to employ a social welfare aggregator that assigns a social preference to 
every possible profile of individual preferences. We use the following social welfare 
aggregator S: 
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where  t i, ω are weights that are used to aggregate regions. Weights, as the discount rate, can be 
chosen on either normative or positive consideration. We experiment different weights and 
explicitly look at their effect on results. In particular, we have considered weights equal to the 

























 and weights proportional to the population 
share.  The first set  of weights represents a social welfare aggregation rule which is neutral 
on the distribution of wealth among coalition members. The weights  t i, ω  linearize the 
contribution of players utility functions to social welfare and avoids wealth transfers from 
wealthy players to poor players and from the future to the present. Therefore, abatement effort 
is distributed with the sole objective to minimize coalition’s emissions reduction costs, that is 
to equalise marginal abatement costs across regions. This allocation of abatement effort, and    
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the uniqueness of the shadow value of carbon, is reminiscent of a decentralized solution in 
which a global market for carbon is implemented. In fact, the social welfare aggregator that 
we use produces the same actions as in a decentralized solution which internalizes the 
environmental externality among coalition members and uses an international market of 
carbon to distribute abatement effort.
2 We also experiment with  weights proportional to 
population, which give more emphasis to developing countries, the countries that are going to 
suffer more from climate change. This is then reflected on the overall environmental objective 
of the coalition as well as in the distribution of the effort.  
The WITCH model analysis assumes a non-cooperative, simultaneous, open membership, 
Nash game with non-orthogonal free-riding, and allows for the possibility of international 
transfers to enlarge climate coalitions. It is also possible to simulate issue linkage to increase 
the profitability and stability of coalitions by letting regions to cooperate on externalities other 
than the environmental one. In essence, the framework considers immediate, irreversible and 
self-enforcing participation to climate change mitigation action, and abstracts from other 
possible bargaining options such as delayed participation, renegotiation, sanctions or joint 
negotiation in multiple areas (e.g.  climate and international trade). In order to simulate 
coalition formation, the model is solved as a one-shot meta-game. In the first stage players 
decide on their participation and coalitions are formed. In the second stage players choose 
their optimal emission levels internalizing only the environmental externality. The game is 
then solved backward. In the second stage, coalition members maximize aggregate joint 
welfare, whereas non participants behave as singletons and maximize individual welfare. The 
equilibrium is found employing the γ-characteristic function approach (Chander and Tulkens, 
1997): in the unique Nash equilibrium coalition members jointly play their best response to 
non-coalition members, who adopt individually their best-reply strategies. 
The game exhibits positive spillovers. When a new member joins the coalition all countries 
outside the coalition are better off because they benefit from: (1) a better environment, (2) 
technology spillovers (knowledge is not a club good) and (3) lower fossil fuel prices. 
                                                      
2 The weights  t i, ω  are often referred to as the Negishi weights, from Negishi (1960). Negishi weights have the 
peculiar property of transforming a competitive economy problem into a centralized social planner problem and 
are sometimes used by Integrated Assessment Models.   8
Let us now introduce some crucial definitions hat are later used in the paper to study 
coalitions.  
In order to exist, coalitions must be both profitable and stable (D’Aspremont et al., 1983; 
D’Aspremont and Gabszewicz, 1986; Donsimoni et al., 1986; Carraro and Siniscalco, 1991). 
A coalition  Γ ∈ γ  is said to be profitable if coalition members have a higher welfare than in a 
scenario where the coalition is not formed (Nash equilibrium):  γ γ ∈ ∀ ≥ i W W
Nash
i i ) ( . Where 
) (γ i W  is the welfare of player i that belongs to coalition γ , and 
Nash
i W  is the welfare of 
player i in the fully non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. 
This is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the coalition to be formed. A second 
requirement concerns stability. A coalition γ  is said to be stable if it is internally  and 
externally  stable. A coalition is internally stable if signatory countries do not have the 
incentive to defect and to behave non-cooperatively when other coalition members cooperate, 
i.e.  ) \ ( ) ( i W W i i i γ γ γ ≥ ∈ ∀ , where  ) \ ( i Wi γ  denotes the welfare of player i when all 
members but i are cooperating. A coalition is externally stable if there is no incentive to 
enlarge the coalition by including non-signatory countries:  }) { ( ) ( i W W i i i ∪ ≥ ∉ ∀ γ γ γ .  
Finally, a coalition γ  is potentially internally stable if it can be turned into a stable coalition 






+ ∑∑∈ t t
t i
i t i r
γ μ γ ∈ ∀i  , with  t i r,  denoting region i interest rate. This is the case when  
coalition γ  has sufficient resources to pay every member of γ  its outside option. 
3.  ASSESSING THE DRIVERS OF PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
CLIMATE COALITIONS 
The incentives for main emitting countries to participate in climate coalitions ultimately 
depend on a wide range of economic and political factors, not all of which can be captured by 
model-based exercises. Bearing this caveat in mind, the analysis carried out in this paper 
covers the major economic drivers of participation incentives, including the expected impacts    
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of climate change, the influence of distant impacts on current policy decisions (i.e. the 
discount rate), and the costs of mitigation policies. This Section describes how each of these 
three drivers are captured in the WITCH model analysis undertaken in this paper, and how 
participation incentives vary across the main world regions. 
3.1.  Climate change impacts in WITCH 
Adequate knowledge of climate change impacts is a prerequisite for well-informed climate 
change mitigation policies. Alternative assumptions regarding such impacts can lead to 
profoundly different policy insights, in terms of the outcome of cost-benefit analyses and the 
incentives for individual regions to participate in climate coalitions.  
Estimating the economic impacts of climate change raises a number of difficult issues. First, 
the knowledge on the physical impacts of climate is limited, especially in relation to 
nonmarket areas or impacts. Second, assigning monetary values to climate change damages is 
particularly challenging. Third, the need to identify the global cost-benefit optimal emission 
level requires defining an indicator of the global benefits of emission reduction in terms of 
avoided damages. Therefore, impacts have to be aggregated across impacts, across regions, 
which raises equity issues, and over time, which raises intergenerational issues.  
Surveying the literature on impacts of climate change it is immediately clear damage 
estimates vary widely and uncertainty in the size of economic impact affects mostly non-
market areas (Tol, 2002, Jamet and Jan Corfee-Morlot, 2009)
3. Non-market impacts are either 
not considered or underestimated. Most IAMs are indeed based on out-of-date evidence, and 
most regional estimates are extrapolations from studies that have been carried out for one or 
two regions, typically the United States (DICE/RICE, MERGE and PAGE) or the United 
Kingdom (FUND). Most damage functions used in IAMs have not been updated according to 
latest evidence on climate change, except for the PAGE model used in the Stern Review, 
which takes into account new evidence on more rapid warming and large-scale changes to the 
climate system (“system” surprise). As a consequence, previous modeling exercises exhibit 
impacts that, on average, are quite small compared with the results described in the Stern 
                                                      
3  For a detailed survey of the literature on climate change impacts we refer to Appendix 3 in Bosetti et al 
(2009b).   10
Review, but also compared with the latest estimates such as those reported in the UNFCCC 
report (UNFCCC, 2007) or in the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2007). 
Two alternative damage scenarios are considered here: i) a low damage scenario, embedded 
in the basic version of the WITCH model, which in turn is based on the damage assessment 
provided by Nordhaus and Boyer (2000); ii) a high damage scenario, which incorporates more 
recent, higher damage estimates in the range of  Stern (2007) and UNFCC (2007). 
The WITCH model accounts for climate change damages, Ω, by means of regional functions 
that describe reduced-form quadratic relationship between temperature, T, and gross world 




, 1 t i t i
t i
t i T T
GDP
θ θ + +
= Ω
  (2) 
In the low damage scenario, for an increase in temperature below 3°C, climate change 
impacts on GDP can be either positive or negative, depending on regional vulnerability and 
geographic location. Above that level, damages are negative throughout the world and 
increase in a quadratic relationship with temperature. The resulting pattern of regional 
damages in a baseline as usual scenario shows higher estimated losses in developing 
countries, in particular South Asia (including India) and Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 1). These 
two regions are expected to lose the most from climate change, especially because of higher 
damages in agriculture and the increase of vector-born diseases (Sub-Saharan Africa) and 
because of catastrophic climate impacts (South Asia including India). A recent review (Jamet 
and Corfee-Morlot, 2009) also indicates Africa and South and Southeast Asia as the most 
vulnerable regions, with GDP losses reaching more than 8% for a temperature increase above 
pre-industrial levels between 2 and 2.5°C. Damage estimates for agriculture, coastal 
settlements and catastrophic climate impacts are significant in Western Europe, resulting in 
higher damages than in other developed regions. In China, Eastern EU countries, non-EU 
Eastern European countries (including Russia), Japan-Korea, climate change up to 2.5°C 
would bring small benefits, essentially because of a reduction in energy demand for heating 
purposes (non-EU Eastern European countries including Russia) or positive effects on 
agricultural productivity (China).     
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In the alternative, higher damage scenario the threshold above which impacts can only be 
negative throughout the world is 1°C. Global climate damages are, by the end of the century  
about twice as large as in the low damage scenario. 
Figure 1. Regional damage functions in the baseline as usual of the WITCH model.  
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1. Korea is grouped with Japan, but is not an Annex I country. Source: WITCH model simulations. 
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Source: WITCH model simulations and UNFCCC (2007).   12
Figure 2 illustrates the time profile of the two climate damage scenarios comparing them to 
climate change damages that can be extrapolated from the IPCC ranges reported in UNFCCC 
(2007. The WITCH high damage function follows UNFCCC data quite closely until a 1.5°C 
rise in global temperature, and increases more sharply beyond, moving closer to –  but 
remaining lower than –  Stern’s (2007) estimates.  
3.2.  Discounting and pure rate of time preference  
When analyzing the inter-temporal effects of climate change damages, the social discount rate 
and, in particular, the pure rate of time preference plays a crucial role. There is a longstanding 
controversy regarding the choice of the latter  (Weitzman, 2001). Consistent with a long line 
of economists (e.g.  Ramsey, 1928; Harrod, 1948; Solow, 1974), Stern (2007) argues on 
ethical grounds for a near-zero value, while others dismiss this assumption on the grounds 
that it is inconsistent with actual individual behaviour (e.g.  Nordhaus, 2007; Weitzman, 
2007). 
Aggregate discounted impacts are vastly increased if greater weight is assigned to the far 
future, when damages are expected to be higher. Combining about hundred estimates from 27 
studies to form a probability distribution for the marginal cost of carbon, Tol (2005) finds that 
the median value of the social cost of carbon – an estimate of the marginal impact caused by 
one additional ton of carbon – increases from $US7 to 39 per ton of carbon when the pure rate 
of time preference declines from 3% to 0%, i.e. when it declines from the value used in 
Nordhaus’ DICE/RICE model to that used in the Stern Review. This implies that cost-benefit 
considerations would lead to very different abatement, depending on the value of pure rate of 
time preference. Indeed, in our subsequent analysis we show that only if future damages are 
given enough weight, i.e. a 0.1% pure rate of time preference is adopted, the grand coalition 
endogenously achieve stabilisation targets that are in line with those discussed in the policy 
debate, e.g. 550ppme (see Section 4).  
In order to take into account the existing debate on the choice of the social discount rate, we 
perform our analyses under two different assumptions regarding the pure rate of time 
preference, namely 3% and 0.1%.
4  
                                                      
4.  Following Weitzman (2001), the pure rate of time preference is also assumed to be time-declining.    
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3.3.  Abatement costs 
The incentives to participate in climate coalitions are also shaped by mitigation policy costs. 
One determinant of these costs is the shape of the aggregate marginal abatement cost curve 
(MAC), which is a reduced-form relationship between the cost of abating an extra unit of 
emissions and cumulative abatement. In WITCH, mitigation costs are the result of energy 
switching, energy intensity improvement and innovation investments.  It is possible to 
compute and compare MACs across countries by running a range of global carbon tax 
scenarios and report the resulting abatement. By repeating this exercise for a wide set of 
carbon taxes, it is possible to draw a relationship between marginal abatement costs and 
cumulative emissions abatement for the 12  regions of the model.
5 Figure  3 reports the 
marginal abatement costs as a function of relative abatement with respect to baseline. 
WITCH’s MACs show the usual convex relation due to increasing marginal abatement costs. 
A $US100 tax per ton of CO2eq achieves a cumulative CO2 abatement between 53% and 
73%, depending on the region. China and the United States have relatively lower/flatter 
marginal abatement curves, compared with other regions. MACs tend to become steep in all 
regions beyond a tax of $US150 per ton of CO2eq.  
One can also look at the cost, measured in terms of the discounted consumption loss, 
alternative world carbon tax scenarios imply, Figure 4. Developing countries are found to 
incur larger losses than their developed counterparts, due to their higher energy/carbon 
intensity. Fossil fuel producers such as the Middle East and non-EU Eastern European 
countries (including Russia) are the biggest losers, reflecting both terms-of-trade losses and 
their very high energy/carbon intensity. Within the group of developed regions, Western 
Europe and Japan-Korea would face smaller costs than the United States despite steeper 
MACs, reflecting their lower energy/carbon intensity.  
                                                      
5.  Each carbon tax path considered is not constant, but instead is assumed to grow over time at the rate at which 
marginal abatement costs grow in the cooperative solution of the model. Obviously different dynamics of the tax 
would imply different MACs. For the sake of the analysis though we find it useful to report representative 
MACs. In order to focus only on abatement costs, all damages from climate change are excluded from this 
exercise.   14
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1. Korea is grouped with Japan, but is not an Annex I country. 
Source: WITCH model simulations.    
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1. Korea is grouped with Japan in the WITCH model, but is not an Annex I country. 
2. Cumulative consumption gap relative to baseline in present value terms over 2015-2100, using a 3% annual discount rate. 
Source: WITCH model simulations. 
 
The larger a region’s mitigation costs under a global carbon tax, the smaller its incentives to 
participate in a climate coalition, ceteris paribus. One possible measure of free-riding 
incentives that will be introduced and discussed below is the difference (in %) between a 
region’s welfare (defined as the discounted sum of the logarithm of future domestic per-capita 
consumption) if it free rides on a world coalition of acting countries, and its welfare if it 
participates in that coalition. As Figure  5 shows, there is a strong positive relationship   16
between that synthetic indicator of free-riding incentives and the overall consumption loss 
induced by a given world carbon tax – set here at $US100 per ton of CO2eq. This is because 
climate coalitions are assumed to implement an efficient climate policy, i.e. to  equalise 
marginal abatement costs across all participating regions.
6 As a result, countries that face 
larger costs from a given world carbon price can expect to gain less from joining an 
international coalition, and therefore have larger incentives to defect, ceteris paribus.  
 
















































1. The free-riding incentive is computed as the difference in % between a region's intertemporal welfare if it withdraws from a 
world coalition of acting countries (the so-called “grand-coalition”, see Section 3), and its intertemporal welfare if it participates in 
the world coalition. A 0.1% annual pure rate of time preference is used to compute the present value of welfare. 
2. Cumulative consumption gap relative to baseline in present value terms over 2015-2100, using a 3% annual discount rate. 
Source: WITCH model simulations. 
4.  ANALYSING COALITION FORMATION AND STABILITY 
4.1.  Cooperative versus non-cooperative outcomes 
We start our analysis from the most environmental effective coalition, namely the grand 
coalition. A world social planner maximizes the aggregate global welfare, which  is defined as 
                                                      
6.  This is a consequence of using Negishi weights to aggregate welfare.    
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the weighted sum of regional welfares, using the Negishi weights to ensure equal marginal 
abatement costs worldwide. Later we see the effect of changing aggregating weights on 
coalitions.
7  
We compare this optimal outcome with the non-cooperative outcome where each of the 
12 regions is assumed to choose the optimal path of a set of choice variables (investments in 
physical capital, in different energy technologies, in R&D, etc.) so as to maximize its own 
social welfare function. In this framework, each region takes its decisions individually, given 
the action of the other players. The outcome of this non-cooperative game is an open loop 
Nash equilibrium.  
Figure 6 shows the implications of the two solution concepts for global GHG emissions under 
the different assumptions about the damage and discounting assumptions. In the non-
cooperative case, upper panel, world emissions grow throughout the century. Little abatement 
is undertaken since individual regions do not internalise the negative externality they impose 
on other regions, taking only into account the domestic ancillary benefits of their climate 
policy. The choice of the pure rate of time preference or of the damage scenario, in this 
instance, do not make much of a difference. In addition a higher discount rate implies not only 
a higher weight on future damages – which should favour emission reductions – but also a 
higher consumption path – which leads to higher emissions. When regions only see their own 
damage, the relative strength of the second factor is larger, determining higher emissions.  
If instead countries gather in a climate grand coalition, the environmental externality is fully 
internalised, and emissions are reduced drastically (lower panel of Figure 6). In addition, 
sensitivity to underlying assumptions is far greater than in the non-cooperative case. Under 
these damage/discounting assumptions, the optimal emission path would be such to stabilise 
long-run GHG concentration at about 546 ppm CO2-eq, when the pure rate of time preference 
is 0.1%, and 676 ppm CO2eq when it is 3%.  When looking at the relative effect of lower 
                                                      
7.  In this analysis we assume cooperation is on the climate externality only. The WITCH model incorporates 
other economic externalities related to the use of natural resources and to the production and diffusion of 
knowledge and experience. However, this paper analyses the incentive to form climate coalitions, independently 
from linkages with other issues. In that context, it is assumed that countries decide whether or not to cooperate 
on the environmental externality only. Cooperation on technological externalities and on the use of natural 
resources is not considered.    18
discounting and of higher damages, the former has a sizeable greater impact, in particular on 
short term emissions. 
Figure 6. Sensitivity of the cooperative and non-cooperative solutions to alternative damage 


































































































q Panel A. Non-cooperative solution
Low damage - High discount rate
Low damage - Low discount rate
High damage - Low discount rate
































































































q Panel B. Cooperative solution
Low damage - High discount rate
Low damage - Low discount rate
High damage - Low discount rate
High damage - High discount rate
 
 Source: WITCH model simulations. 
 
The difference between the cooperative and non-cooperative outcomes gives an indication of 
the gains from cooperation, which are substantial. The theory of self-enforcing agreements 
teaches us that the larger the potential benefits of cooperation, the stronger the incentive to 
free ride  (Barrett 1994). The damage and discounting assumptions also affect the size of    
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cooperation gains. A high discount rate reduces the benefits from cooperation, the more so 
when damages are low. 
4.2. Environmental effectiveness, profitability and stability of climate coalitions  
With 12 regions the number of possible coalition is very large. However, we focus on a subset 
of large coalitions that would have the potential to endogenously produce targets commonly  
discussed in the policy arena (e.g. in line with the 600 and 550 ppm CO2 eq 2100 atmospheric 
targets). We perform the cost-benefit analysis of each of these coalitions under different 
assumptions on the pure rate of time preference, damage scenario, and weighting 
assumptions.
8 We first discuss the environmental effectiveness of this subset of coalition and 
then look at their profitability and stability. 
Among the larger coalitions, only the grand coalition is found to stabilise GHG concentration 
below 550  ppm CO2-eq by 2100. This is illustrated in Table  1, which shows the 
environmental performance of the grand coalition together with 6 large coalitions that have 
the technical potential to meet similar targets at the 2100 horizon. The composition of these 
coalitions suggests that large emitters such as China and India are to be included. We always 
exclude Sub-Saharan Africa from all these sub-coalitions as it is realistic to assume that, if 
any other region will stay out, then Sub-Saharan Africa will necessarily follow, invoking 
equity arguments such as the right to grow. Even if only Sub-Saharan Africa behaves as a 
singleton, the 550 ppm CO2-eq target in 2100 is no longer reached. Leaving an additional 
region out of the coalition raises GHG concentration above the target 600 ppm.  
                                                      
8 In what follows we only report results for the high damage scenario which is most conducive to significant 
emission reductions by the coalition considered. If a coalition is not environmentally effective in this case, it 
cannot be either under lower damages.   20
Table 1. Analysis of the environmental achievements of potentially effective coalitions, cost-benefit mode,  
high-damage/low-discounting case    
Overall GHG concentration (ppm CO2 eq)
2050 2100
Non-participating regions:
None (Grand coalition) 507 546
Africa 518 603
Africa, Latin America 532 612
Africa, Non-EU Eastern Europe 531 603
Africa, Middle East and North Africa 529 609
Africa, South East Asia 526 598
Africa, South East Asia, Non-EU Eastern Europe 529 603
 
 Source: WITCH model simulations. 
Two main factors explain the failure of smaller coalitions to achieve the 550  ppme 
concentration target:
9 
1.  Smaller coalitions internalise only a fraction of the environmental externality. The 
fraction of damage that is not internalised drives a gap between the coalition and the 
global marginal benefit of emission reduction. The larger this gap, the smaller the 
emission cut that the coalition achieves. However, there is not a clear relationship 
between coalition size, coalition marginal damage, and emission reductions, because 
damages are not evenly distributed among world regions. This implies that the 
inclusion in the coalition of regions facing larger damages from climate change 
increases coalition’s marginal damage, and the optimal level of emission cuts, ceteris 
paribus. 
2.  As coalitions get less inclusive, the number of free-riders obviously increases; these 
countries might simply keep emission unchanged, or even undertake some small 
abatement due to the lower price of carbon-free technologies, but most likely they  
rather increase emissions and undo some of the coalition reduction. 
                                                      
9 One assumption is crucial here and may alter these results: the absence of negative emissions technologies, or 
any other technology that might alter the climate (i.e. geo-engineering). If one assumed that by means of 
bioenergy and carbon capture and sequestration, or direct CO2 capture, or other technologies that alter the 
incoming solar radiation, cooperating countries could dramatically change the climate, than the requirements on 
the dimension and composition of a coalition to endogenously produce the 550 ppm CO2eq by 2100 target 
would be substantially different.    
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These two forces undermining the achievement of sub-coalitions can be illustrated by looking 
at a coalition structure under which only Sub Saharan Africa does not participate and behaves 
as a singleton (Figure 7). First, leaving out Sub-Saharan Africa means not internalising a large 
share of the global damage (see Figure 1, together with South Asia, Sub Saharan countries 
would suffer the largest damage). As a consequence, such coalition would achieve 
significantly lower abatement effort compared to the grand coalition. Second, the emissions of 
Sub Saharan Africa itself increase dramatically when it behaves as a singleton.  It is worth 
noting that, although the emissions of the Sub-Saharan African region are larger than in the 
grand coalition, they are lower than in the non-cooperative scenario. Although Africa could 
emit as much as in the non-cooperative scenario or even more, it does not find it optimal to do 
so. The reason is the presence of international technology transfers from the cooperative bloc 
that reduces the costs of carbon-free technologies outside the coalition itself.
10  
Figure 7. An illustration of free-riding incentives: the case of Africa  
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   Source: WITCH model simulations. 
An important factor in shaping the effectiveness of coalition is the weight given to future 
damages by setting the pure rate of time preference. A higher rate implies, for the grand 
coalition, an addition of GHG concentration in the atmosphere equal to 125 ppm CO2-eq 
                                                      
10 Depending on the stringency of the target and the characteristic of the free riding countries either the energy 
market or the innovation effect may prevail, see Bosetti and DeCian (2011) for a thorughout discussion of these 
competing effects.   22
compared to the low discounting case approximately equivalent to an additional warming of 
0.5°C.  Smaller coalitions, already reaching more than 600 ppm CO2-eq with a low discount 
rate, would lead to an increase of 80 ppm CO2-eq or more. 
Finally, the coalition effectiveness is obviously affected by the weights used to aggregate 
different regions when maximizing aggregate welfare. The results discussed so far are based 
on Negishi weights, which implies a cost-efficient allocation of abatement within the 
coalition. Table 2 looks again at the grand coalition and compares the solution based on 
Negishi  weights with that based  on a weighting scheme more favourable to developing 
countries, proportional to the population share. This aggregation scheme increases the 
environmental effectiveness of the coalition in the short and medium term, and also in the 
long term with a sufficiently high discount rate. However, with low discount rate the 
population social welfare aggregator yields higher GHG emissions concentrations in 2100. 
 
Table 2. Analysis of the environmental achievements of potentially effective coalitions, cost-benefit mode,  
high-damage/low and high discounting using different weights 
Overall GHG concentration (ppm CO2 eq)
2030 2050 2100
Negishi weight- 0.1% 480 507 546
Population weight - 0.1% 473 502 556
Negishi weight - 3% 506 574 672
Population weight- 3% 489 538 622  
   Source: WITCH model simulations. 
 
International climate coalitions need not only to be environmentally effective, but should also 
be self-enforcing. In technical terms, this means that a coalition should be  profitable and 
stable, or at least potentially stable. As noted in Section 2, a coalition is profitable if each 
cooperating player has a welfare larger than that she would get in the non-cooperative 
scenario. A coalition is internally stable if the welfare of each participating region is larger or 
equal to the welfare she would obtain from staying out of the coalition and free riding on 
participants’ abatement efforts. As an example, when we check the stability of the grand 
coalition we need to run simulations in which either of the 12 regions is assumed to deviate,    
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while the others continue to cooperate. By comparing discounted consumption in the 
cooperation and non-cooperation case and we can then check whether and how many 
countries have an incentive to abandon the grand coalition. Although not stable, a coalition 
might be Potentially Internally Stable (PIS) if there is a transfer scheme that gives each 
member at least her free-riding pay-off and shares the remaining surplus.  
For different coalitions Table 3 reports profitability, internal and potential internal stability. 
As expected, all large coalitions considered in the analysis are not profitable, as there is 
always at least one region, namely China and Sub-Saharan Africa when it applies, which is 
worse off than in the non-cooperative case.  
 
Table 3. Profitability and Stability of potentially effective coalitions  
Non-participating regions Profitability Internal Stability Potential Stability
Low PRTP (0.1%) - Negishi Weighted
None (Grand coalition) NO (Africa, China) NOT STAB (All) NOT PIS
Africa NO (China) NOT STAB (All) NOT PIS
Africa ,  Latin America NO (China) NOT STAB (All) PIS
Africa , Non-EU Eastern Europe NO (China) NOT STAB (All) PIS
Africa , Middle East and North Africa NO (China) NOT STAB (All) PIS
Africa ,  South East Asia NO (China) NOT STAB (All) PIS
Africa ,  South East Asia, Non-EU Eastern Eu NO (China) NOT STAB (All) PIS
High PRTP (3%) - Negishi Weighted
None (Grand coalition) YES
NOT STAB (All but China and 
Latin America) PIS
Low PRTP (0.1%) - Population Weighted
None (Grand coalition)
NO (All but Africa, South Asia, 
South-East Asia) NOT STAB (All but Africa) NOT PIS
In parenthesis countries for which coalitions are not profitable or internally stable  
Source: WITCH model simulations. 
 
Last column in table 3 report results on whether coalition can be stabilized through transfers, 
i.e. they are potentially internally stable. We do this by checking if the aggregate residual 
surplus of consumption in the coalition is greater than the sum of the discounted consumption 
gains that countries have when they free-ride . We find that the grand coalition is not PIS. The 
aggregate, discounted surplus from cooperation is equal to 477 USD trillions over the 2005-
2100 time horizon, while the sum of the gains from free-riding is equal to 680 USD trillions. 
We then test the coalition that includes all regions but Africa, the most environmental 
effective of all partial coalitions. We find that this coalition also is not potentially internally   24
stable, but the gap  is now only 2% of the aggregate discounted consumption gain of the 
coalition. The smaller PECs are PIS. Therefore we find that the lowest level of GHG 
concentration that can be achieved by a stable coalition is slightly above 518 ppm CO2-eq in 
2050 and around 600 ppm CO2-eq in 2100. 
To provide greater insight on internal stability, and how this interplays with crucial 
assumptions on the aggregation and discounting choices, Figure 8 reports free-riding 
incentives across regions, based on the difference in welfare between free riding on and 
participating to the grand coalition. Let us start by looking at the blue bars, that refer to the 
central case of 0.1% discounting and Negishi weights. 
The Middle East-North Africa region, China, the rest of Africa, and non-EU Eastern 
European countries are estimated to have the largest incentive to free ride. By contrast, 
developed countries have the lowest free-riding incentives, with the exception of the 
Australia-Canada-New Zealand region. 
 
Figure 8. Estimated ranking of free-riding incentives across regions 













 Source: WITCH model simulations. 
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What happens if the pure rate of time preference used in the analysis is 3% instead of 0.1% 
(see second row in Table 3)? Not only each region's welfare is larger in the grand coalition 
than in the non-cooperative case, i.e. the grand coalition is profitable, but the incentives to 
free ride are now much smaller, although the coalition is not stable, nor internally stable. We 
find that the discounted surplus, in consumption terms, generated by cooperation (133 USD 
trillions) is four times greater than the discounted aggregate surplus from free-riding (35 USD 
trillions).  
This result confirms a well-established result in coalition theory. When gains from 
cooperation are large, as in the 0.1% case, free riding incentives are also likely to be high. On 
the contrary, when gains from cooperation are small, as in the 3% case, free riding incentives 
are reduced significantly. Figure 8 reiterates this by showing incentive to free ride when the 
discount rate is higher, green bars There is a clear message that emerges from our analysis. 
Cooperation is indeed possible, profitable and potentially stable, but only if the environmental 
target is moderate (at least compared to what currently discussed in the policy debate), i.e. 
around 600 ppm CO2-eq by 2100.  
Finally, we test how using a different set of weights affects the results (see the last row in 
Table 3). When using population-based weights, the grand coalition is profitable only for 
Africa, South Asia, and South-East Asia and it is not internally stable (only Africa sees 
welfare gains from cooperation that compensate incentives to deviate). Figure 8 (red bars) 
shows that when population weights are used, the regional pattern of free-riding incentives is 
reversed with respect to the cost-effective abatement allocation implemented through Negishi 
weights. First, with population weights the abatement allocation is no longer the efficient one. 
In addition, perceiving a larger damage, the grand coalition abates more. The effort is shared 
across all members, which all abate more compared to the Negishi aggregation, with the 
exception of Africa, South Asia, and South-East Asia. These regions have two characteristics. 
Because of their high population they receive the largest weights in the social welfare 
function, together with China. They have the largest benefits from cooperation, and in fact, 
cooperation results profitable for them. This characteristics lead to a high benefit-cost ratio, 
which explains their very low free riding incentives. This result suggests that a different 
allocation of the effort can have important implication on countries incentives to participate.    26
5. Conclusions 
This paper has studied the incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate 
coalitions using the integrated assessment model WITCH. The WITCH model has a game-
theoretic structure in which different degrees of international cooperation can be simulated. 
When countries decide whether or not to cooperate on GHG emission control, they take into 
account how their decisions affect all other countries, and whether these countries will 
cooperate or remain outside the coalition. The optimal level of abatement in each coalition has 
been derived in a cost-benefit framework. The main incentives to participate in climate 
coalitions mainly depend in WITCH on two major economic drivers, namely the abatement 
costs incurred and the damages avoided both within and outside a coalition. We have 
performed the analysis of coalitions profitability and stability under four alternative 
combinations of damage and discount rate and assessed the effect of two different schemes of 
aggregating welfare across countries. The high damage-low discount rate combination is the 
most conducive to cooperation for emissions control because it increases in both directions 
the size of expected present value of climate change damages. The low damage-high discount 
rate combination is instead the less conducive to international cooperation. The weighting 
scheme that is proportional to population size also increases the effort of the coalition by 
giving greater weight to developing countries, where most of climate damages are projected 
to occur.  We have confined the analysis of profitability and stability only to the subset of 
coalitions that could attain effective emission reductions, defined as those that have the 
potential to stabilise global GHG concentration between 550 and 600 ppm CO2-eq. The focus 
on a subset of policy-relevant coalitions is particularly convenient and avoids uninteresting 
cumbersome numerical exercises. When account is made for free-riding behaviours of non-
participating regions, only a very broad international coalition excluding no region other than 
Sub-Saharan Africa could achieve meaningful stabilisation targets by 2100. 
Cost-benefit analysis suggests that only the grand coalition finds it optimal as a whole to 
stabilise overall GHG concentration below 550  ppm CO2-eq in the high-damage/low-
discounting case. Smaller coalitions, including the grand coalition excluding Africa, achieve 
less ambitious targets, above 600 ppm CO2-eq. This is because they do not fully internalise 
the global environmental externality and allow a larger number of (non-participating) 
countries to free ride. Although the grand coalition as a whole has an incentive to achieve the    
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550 ppm  CO2eq target, it is not internally stable. Most regions gain more from non-
participation than from participation to the grand coalition. This is true also for smaller 
coalitions. The grand coalition is not potentially internally stable (PIS) either, i.e. no set of 
international financial transfers can be found that would offset the free-riding incentives of all 
participating countries simultaneously. This is because the overall welfare gain from the grand 
coalition relative to the non-cooperative outcome is not large enough to give each country her 
free-riding pay off. After compensating all losers in the coalition, the remaining coalition 
surplus is too small to offset free-riding incentives. The coalition that includes all regions but 
Africa is also not PIS, but the gap between the consumption level after the redistribution of 
cooperation gains is only 2% lower than the consumption level that regions achieve when 
they do not cooperate. All other analysed coalition, that can attain around 600 ppm CO2-eq 
are PIS. 
There is a clear message that emerges from our analysis. Cooperation is indeed possible and 
profitable, but only if the environmental target is moderate (at least compared to what 
currently discussed in the policy debate). In fact, stability, even potential, is ensured only 
when the coalition stabilises GHG concentrations in 2100 above  600 ppm CO2eq. Sensitivity 
of environmental effectiveness, stability concepts, and free riding incentive to different 
manners of weighting regional welfare in the coalition indicate that more ambitious targets 
become optimal when regions with high damages have larger influence. We also show that 
different allocation of the effort could  have important implication on countries incentives to 
participate.  
Our findings are subject to a number of limitations. Even though some sensitivity analysis has 
been carried out to assess the robustness of the main results, it should be acknowledged that 
the model-based analysis relies on strong assumptions. In particular, there are wide 
uncertainties in practice surrounding future emission trends,
11 the market and non-market 
impacts from climate change, the likelihood and effect of catastrophic risks, and the cross-
country distribution of these damages and risks.  
Furthermore, the analysis focuses on immediate, irreversible and self-enforcing participation 
to mitigation action, thereby abstracting from other possible bargaining options including 
                                                      
11.   For instance, projected world BAU emission growth is somewhat higher in WITCH than in the OECD 
model ENV-Linkages as featured in Burniaux et al. (2008) (100% versus 85% over the period 2005-50).   28
e.g.  delayed participation, renegotiation, sanctions or joint negotiation in multiple areas 
(e.g.  linking climate and international trade negotiations. If feasible, these alternative 
bargaining options which might yield different results (see Carraro and Massetti, 2010). For 
instance, a major emitting country may have greater participation incentives than found here 
if it expects its withdrawal to prevent the formation of any coalition. 
The co-benefits from mitigation action, e.g.  in terms of human health, energy security or 
biodiversity, are not taken into account. Other studies suggest that such co-benefits are large, 
although the participation incentives they provide are dampened by the fact that some of these 
co-benefits could be reaped through direct policy action – in particular, local air pollution 
might be reduced at a lower cost through direct policy action than through reductions in GHG 
emissions (Bollen et al. 2009; Burniaux et al. 2008).  
Removal of fossil fuel subsidies, one of the few policies to yield potentially both climate and 
economic benefits, is also omitted from the analysis. Insofar as phasing out subsidies would 
bring an economic gain and lower the carbon intensity of a number of (mainly developing) 
countries, incentives to participate in international mitigation action could improve. 
Another potential limitation of the analysis is to assume that even if a country benefits from 
an international coalition relative to a BAU scenario, it will always prefer to free-ride if that 
option is even more profitable. While this assumption merely derives from individual welfare 
maximisation, current international redistributive policies such as official development aid 
point instead to some degree of altruism. Against this background, there might be a possibility 
for some countries to sign an agreement even if they could in principle gain more from free 
riding on other countries’ abatement efforts. We test this possibility by computing the cost for 
developed countries of using additional resources (additional to the coalition surplus) to 
stabilise the grand coalition, i.e. to give each other region its free-riding pay off. These 
calculations show that with a 3% loss in the discounted value of their consumption levels, 
industrialised countries could stabilise the grand coalition in the high-damage/low-
discounting case, i.e. all other participating regions could be fully compensated for their free-
riding incentives through financial transfers, thereby bringing them into an agreement. 
Finally, two crucial assumptions affect the results presented in the paper. The absence of 
negative emissions technologies or any other technology that might alter the climate (i.e. geo-   
  29
engineering), and the absence of adaptation policies. If one assumed that by means of 
bioenergy and carbon capture and sequestration, or direct CO2 capture, or other technologies 
that alter the incoming solar radiation, cooperating countries could unilaterally change the 
climate, than the requirements on the dimension and composition of a coalition to 
endogenously produce the 550 ppm CO2eq by 2100 target would be substantially different. 
Adaptation policies, by providing benefits that are local, at least within the boundary of 
macro-regions considered in this model, could also change free riding incentives and thus the 
willingness to cooperate on climate change mitigation as well.    30
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